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ON ALGORITHM AND ROBUSTNESS IN A NON-STANDARD
SENSE
SAM SANDERS
Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the invariance properties, i.e. robust-
ness, of phenomena related to the notions of algorithm, finite procedure and
explicit construction. First of all, we provide two examples of objects for which
small changes completely change their (non)computational behavior. We then
isolate robust phenomena in two disciplines related to computability.
1. Introduction
The object -or better concept- of study in Computer Science is unsurprisingly
computation. The notions of algorithm, finite procedure and explicit computation
are central. The present paper investigates the robustness of these notions, i.e. we
are interested in phenomena regarding computation which are reasonably stable
under variations of parameters. Let us first consider two illuminating examples of
non-robust phenomena in Computer Science.
1. Example. Recently1 the following remarkable mathematical object was devel-
oped: a pair of computable2 random variables (X,Y ) for which the conditional
distribution P [Y ∣X] is non-computable2, as it codes the Halting Problem2. Let
CAM be the statement that such (X,Y ) exists. Before trotting out all sorts of
indispensability claims based on CAM, one should bear in mind that the condi-
tional distribution P [Y ∣X] becomes computable again3, after the addition to Y
of some kind of generic noise E. Let CAME be the statement that P [Y + E,X]
is computable, for computable (X,Y ) and generic noise E. Evidently, we may
see CAME as a variation of CAM involving an error parameter. However, the
(non)computational content of CAM is completely different from that of CAME .
Indeed, the addition of the noise E dramatically changes the non-computability of
P [Y,X], and hence the computational content of CAME , compared to CAM. In
short, the computational behavior of P [Y ∣X] is sensitive to minor perturbations
and CAM is non-robust with regard to the addition of error parameters.
2. Example. In Constructive Analysis4, the notion of finite procedure is central.
An object only exists after it has been constructed (in finitely many steps). The fol-
lowing is a well-known negative result of the constructive school: Given a uniformly
continuous function on [0,1] such that f(1) < 0 and f(0) > 0, we cannot in general
This research is generously sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation. See Acknowledge-
ment 17 below.
1See (Freer et al., 2011).
2The words in italics have precise technical definitions to be found in e.g. (Soare, 1987).
3This explains why, in any real-world scenario invariably involving noise, the non-computability
of P [Y ∣X] never manifests itself.
4See (Bishop, 1967) and (Bridges and Vıˆt¸a˘, 2006).
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construct x0 ∈ [0,1] such that f(x0) = 0. In other words, the intermediate value
theorem, INT for short, cannot be proved in Constructive Analysis. By contrast, we
have the following positive result, called INTE : Given  ∈ R and given a uniformly
continuous function on [0,1] such that f(1) < 0 and f(0) > 0, we can construct x0
such that ∣f(x0)∣ < . Again, we may see INTE as a variation of INT involving an
error parameter. Analogous to the previous example, the computational behavior
of the intermediate value is sensitive to minor perturbations: the addition of an
error term makes the former computable (in the sense of Constructive Analysis).
In other words, INT also exhibits computational non-robustness with regard to the
addition of error parameters.
The previous examples provide phenomena regarding computation that are de-
stroyed by a minor variation. In this paper, we intend to identify phenomena re-
garding computation that are not affected by certain variations (like perturbation
of parameters). In other words, we are looking for robust behavior in topics related
to Computer Science. The importance of robustness cannot be overestimated, as
our scientific models of reality are only approximations and tend to incorporate
imprecise assumptions, often for valid reasons such as workability, elegance or sim-
plicity. Thus, if a phenomenon X occurs in a robust model, we are reasonably
certain that X cannot be ascribed to an artifact of the model, but corresponds to
a real-world phenomenon X ′.
A similar point has been made in the past by Ian Hacking and Wesley Salmon. In
particular, the numerous independent ways of deriving Avogadro’s constant (with
negligible errors) are taken by Hacking and Salmon to be sufficient evidence for the
real-world existence of molecules and atoms5. Another example from Hacking is
concerned with the photo-electric effect.
The simple inference argument says it would be an absolute miracle
if for example the photoelectric effect went on working while there
were no photons. The explanation of the persistence of this phe-
nomenon [. . . ] is that photons do exist. As J.J.C. Smart expresses
the idea: ‘One would have to suppose that there were innumer-
able lucky accidents about the behavior mentioned in the observa-
tional vocabulary, so that they behaved miraculously as if they were
brought about by the non-existent things ostensibly talked about
in the theoretical vocabulary.’ The realist then infers that photons
are real [. . . ] (Hacking, 1983, p. 54-55).
In general, numerous independent derivations of the same phenomenon make it
implausible that the latter is an artifact of a particular framework or modeling
assumption, i.e. the phenomenon in question is about something real6. Hence, by
seeking out the robust phenomena involving computation, we may get a better
understanding of the real core of computation, while at the same time develop a
better theory of what exactly constitutes robustness.
We begin our search in two disciplines related to computability, Reverse Math-
ematics and Constructive Analysis, both introduced below. First, in Section 2, we
5See (Hacking, 1983, p. 54-55), (Salmon, 1984, p. 214-220) and (Salmon, 1998, p. 87-88)
6In light of Examples 1 and 2, we may rest assured that intermediate values and conditional
probabilities will always be computable in practice, as actual computational practice suggests.
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study the invariance properties present in Reverse Mathematics, a discipline inti-
mately connected to computability. Secondly, we do the same for Errett Bishop’s
constructive notion of algorithm from Constructive Analysis in Section 3.
2. Reverse Mathematics
In this section, we identify certain invariance properties in Reverse Mathematics.
The latter is closely related to Recursion Theory, a classical framework for studying
(non)computability. A central object in Recursion Theory is the Turing machine7,
introduced next.
2.1. Alan Turing’s machine and Recursion Theory. In 1928, the famous
mathematician David Hilbert posed the Entscheidungsproblem. In modern lan-
guage, the Entscheidungsproblem (or ‘decision problem’) asks for no less than the
construction of an algorithm that decides the truth or falsity of a mathematical
statement. In other words, such an algorithm takes as input a mathematical state-
ment (in a suitable formal language) and outputs ‘true’ or ‘false’ after a finite period
of time.
Before the Entscheidungsproblem could be solved, a formal definition of algo-
rithm was necessary. Both Alonzo Church and Alan Turing provided such a formal-
ism7, being the λ-calculus and the Turing machine, respectively. Church showed
that, if the notion algorithm is formalized using the λ-calculus, then the construc-
tion required to solve the Entscheidungsproblem is impossible. Independently, Tur-
ing showed that the Entscheidungsproblem can be reduced to the Halting Problem,
which is known to have no algorithmic solution, assuming ‘algorithm’ is identified
with ‘computation on a Turing Machine’. In time, it was shown that both for-
malisms, though quite different in nature, enable the computation of the same class
of functions, now called the recursive functions. The latter class was intended to
formalize the notion of recursion, later giving rise to Recursion Theory.
Because of the correspondence between these three formalisms, it is generally
accepted that we should identify the (informal and vague) class of algorithmically
computable functions with the class of function computable by a Turing machine.
This identification hypothesis is called the Church-Turing thesis. However, as sug-
gested by Example 1, not all computability phenomena are robust. In the next
section, we identify a phenomenon in Reverse Mathematics which is.
2.2. Reverse Mathematics and robustness. Reverse Mathematics is a program
in the Foundations of Mathematics founded8 in the Seventies by Harvey Friedman.
Stephen Simpson’s famous monograph Subsystems of Second-order Arithmetic is
the standard reference9. The goal of Reverse Mathematics is to determine the
minimal axiom system necessary to prove a particular theorem of ordinary math-
ematics. Classifying theorems according to logical strength reveals the following
striking phenomenon9.
7See (Church, 1936) and (Turing, 1937). Intuitively, a Turing machine is an idealized computer
with no limits on storage and meomory.
8See (Friedman, 1975; 1976).
9See (Simpson, 2009) for an introduction to Reverse Mathematics and p. xiv for the quote.
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It turns out that, in many particular cases, if a mathematical the-
orem is proved from appropriately weak set existence axioms, then
the axioms will be logically equivalent to the theorem.
This phenomenon is dubbed the ‘Main theme’ of Reverse Mathematics. A good
instance of the latter may be found in the Reverse Mathematics of WKL0
10. An ex-
ample of the Main Theme is that the logical principle WKL is equivalent to Peano’s
existence theorems for ordinary differential equations y′ = f(x, y), the equivalence
being provable in RCA0. Some explanation might be in order: the system RCA0
may be viewed as the logical formalization of the notion Turing machine, which in
turn formalizes the notion of algorithm11. The principle WKL (or Weak Ko¨nig’s
Lemma) states the existence of certain non-computable objects12.
We now consider the system13 ERNA which has no a priori connection to RCA0,
or Reverse Mathematics, or computability14. We will show that a version of the
Main Theme of Reverse Mathematics is also valid in ERNA, but with the predicate
‘=’ replaced by ‘≈’, i.e. equality up to infinitesimals from Nonstandard Analysis15.
Indeed, the following theorem contains several statements, translated from (Simp-
son, 2009, IV) into ERNA’s language, while preserving equivalence.
3. Theorem (Reverse Mathematics for ERNA +Π1-TRANS). The theory ERNA
proves the equivalence between Π1-TRANS and each of the following theorems con-
cerning near-standard functions:
(1) Every S-continuous function on [0,1] is bounded.
(2) Every S-continuous function on [0,1] is continuous there.
(3) Every S-continuous function on [0,1] is Riemann integrable16.
(4) Weierstrass’ theorem: every S-continuous function on [0,1] has, or attains
a supremum, up to infinitesimals.
(5) The strong Brouwer fixed point theorem: every S-continuous function φ ∶[0,1]→ [0,1] has a fixed point up to infinitesimals of arbitrary depth.
(6) The first fundamental theorem of calculus: ( ∫ x0 f(t)dt)′ ≈ f(x).
(7) The Peano existence theorem for differential equations y′ ≈ f(x, y).
(8) The Cauchy completeness, up to infinitesimals, of ERNA’s field.
(9) Every S-continuous function on [0,1] has a modulus of uniform continuity.
(10) The Weierstrass approximation theorem.
A common feature of the items in the previous theorem is that strict equality
has been replaced with ≈, i.e. equality up to infinitesimals. This seems the price to
be paid for ‘pushing down’ into ERNA the theorems equivalent to Weak Ko¨nig’s
lemma. For instance, item (7) from Theorem 3 guarantees the existence of a func-
tion φ(x) such that φ′(x) ≈ f(x,φ(x)), i.e. a solution, up to infinitesimals, of the
10See (Simpson, 2009, Theorem I.10.3).
11Thus, Reverse Mathematics is intimately tied to Recursion Theory and computability.
12In particular, Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma states the existence of an infinite path through an infinite
binary tree. Even for computable infinite binary trees, the infinite path need not be computable.
In other words, WKL is false for the recursive/computable sets. See (Simpson, 2009).
13See (Sanders, 2011) for an introduction to ERNA and a proof of Theorem 3.
14In particular, ERNA was introduced around 1995 by Sommer and Suppes to formalize math-
ematics in physics. See (Sommer and Suppes, 1996; 1997).
15For an introduction to Nonstandard Analysis, we refer to (Kanovei and Reeken, 2004).
16In ERNA, the Riemann integral is only defined up to infinitesimals.
ON ALGORITHM AND ROBUSTNESS IN A NON-STANDARD SENSE 5
differential equation y′ = f(x, y). However, in general, there is no function ψ(x)
such that ψ′(x) = f(x,ψ(x)) in ERNA +Π1-TRANS. In this way, we say that the
Reverse Mathematics of ERNA +Π1-TRANS is a copy up to infinitesimals of the
Reverse Mathematics of WKL0, suggesting the following general principle
17.
4. Principle. Let T (=) be a theorem of ordinary mathematics, involving equality.
If RCA0 proves T (=)⇔WKL, then ERNA proves T (≈)⇔ Π1-TRANS.
Furthermore, there are more results of this nature. In a forthcoming paper, we
show examples of the following general principle18.
5. Principle. Let T (=) be a theorem of ordinary mathematics, involving equality. If
RCA0 proves T (=)⇔WKL, then ERNA+Π2-TRANS proves T (≋)⇔ Π3-TRANS.
Here, the predicate ‘≋’ is best described as ‘equality up to arbitrarily small in-
finitesimals’. At least two more variations19 are possible and in each instance, we
obtain a similar principle concerning equivalences.
We conclude that the equivalences proved in Reverse Mathematics display a cer-
tain degree of robust behavior: First of all, we observe similar series of equivalences
in different frameworks20. In other words, the equivalences observed in classical
Reverse Mathematics are not an artifact of the framework, as they occur elsewhere
in similar forms. Secondly, the equivalences in classical Reverse Mathematics re-
main valid when we consider different error predicates, i.e. replace equality by ‘≈’
or ‘≋’. Thus, small perturbations in the form of error predicates do not destroy the
observed equivalences.
3. Reuniting the antipodes
In this section21, we show that the notion of algorithm in Constructive Analysis
is endowed with a degree of robustness. This is achieved indirectly by defining a
new notion called ‘Ω-invariance’ inside Nonstandard Analysis, and showing that it
is close to the constructive notion of algorithm, as it gives rise to the same kind of
Reverse Mathematics results. In other words, there are two different notions of finite
procedure, i.e. the constructive notion of algorithm and Ω-invariance, which both
give rise to the same kind of equivalences in (Constructive) Reverse Mathematics.
Again, we observe that the latter are not affected by some change of framework.
3.1. The notion of finite procedure in Nonstandard Analysis. Here, we
define Ω-invariance, a central notion, inside (classical) Nonstandard Analysis. We
show that Ω-invariance is quite close to the notion of finite procedure.
With regard to notation, we take N = {0,1,2, . . .} to denote the set of natural
numbers, which is extended to ∗N = {0,1,2, . . . , ω, ω+1, . . .}, the set of hypernatural
numbers, with ω /∈ N. The set Ω = ∗N ∖N consists of the infinite numbers, whereas
17A similar (and equally valid) principle is If RCA0 proves T (=), then ERNA proves T (≈).
18A similar principle is If RCA0 proves T (=), then ERNA +Π2-TRANS proves T (≋).
19The first one is the removing of parameters in Π1-TRANS and the second one is the assump-
tion of a greatest relevant infinite element.
20Note that ERNA is a system of first-order Nonstandard Analysis, whereas Reverse Mathe-
matics usually takes place in second-order arithmetic.
21The title of this section is explained in Remark 16 below. The italicized concepts are intro-
duced in Section 3.2.
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the natural numbers are finite. Finally, a formula is bounded or ‘∆0’, if all the
quantifiers are bounded by terms and no infinite numbers occur.
6. Definition (Ω-invariance). Let ψ(n,m) be ∆0 and fix ω ∈ Ω.
The formula ψ(n,ω) is Ω-invariant if
(1) (∀n ∈ N)(∀ω′ ∈ Ω)(ψ(n,ω)↔ ψ(n,ω′)).
For f ∶ N ×N→ N, the function f(n,ω) is called Ω-invariant, if
(2) (∀n ∈ N)(∀ω′ ∈ Ω)(f(n,ω) = f(n,ω′)).
Now, any object ϕ(ω) defined using an infinite number ω is potentially non-
computable, as infinite numbers can code (non-recursive) sets of natural numbers22.
Hence, it is not clear how an Ω-invariant object might be computable or construc-
tive in any sense. However, although an Ω-invariant object clearly involves an
infinite number, the object does not depend on the choice of the infinite number,
by definition. Furthermore, by the following theorem, the truth value of ψ(n,ω)
and the value of f(n,ω) is already determined at some finite number.
7. Theorem (Modulus lemma). For every Ω-invariant formula ψ(n,ω),(∀n ∈ N)(∃m0 ∈ N)(∀m,m′ ∈ ∗N)[m,m′ ≥m0 → ψ(n,m)↔ ψ(n,m′)].
For every Ω-invariant function f(n,ω), we have(∀n ∈ N)(∃m0 ∈ N)(∀m,m′ ∈ ∗N)[m,m′ ≥m0 → f(n,m) = f(n,m′)].
In each case, the number m0 is computed by an Ω-invariant function.
Proof. Although the proof of this lemma is outside of the scope of this paper, it is
worth mentioning that it makes essential use of the fact that an Ω-invariant object
does not depend on the choice of infinite number. 
The previous theorem is called ‘modulus lemma’ as it bears a resemblance to
the modulus lemma from Recursion Theory23. Intuitively, our modulus lemma
states that the properties of an Ω-invariant object are already determined at some
finite number. This observation suggests that the notion of Ω-invariance models
the notion of finite procedure quite well.
Another way of interpreting Ω-invariance is as follows: Central to any version
of constructivism is that there are basic objects (e.g. the natural numbers) and
there are certain basic operations on these objects (e.g. recursive functions or
constructive algorithms). All other objects are non-basic (aka ‘non-constructive’
or ‘ideal’), and are to be avoided, as they fall outside the constructive world. It
goes without saying that infinite numbers in ∗N are ideals objects par excellence.
Nonetheless, our modulus lemma suggests that if an object does not depend on the
choice of ideal element in its definition, it is not ideal, but actually basic. This
is the idea behind Ω-invariance: ideal objects can be basic if their definition does
not really depend on the choice of any particular ideal element. In this way, Ω-
invariance approaches the notion of finite procedure from above, while the usual
methods work from the ground up by defining a set of basic constructive operations
and a method for combining/iterating these.
We now consider two examples of Ω-invariant objects.
22See (Keisler, 2006).
23See (Soare, 1987, Lemma 3.2).
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8. Remark. First of all, assume we have (∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n), with ϕ ∈ ∆0. Then the
function24 (µn ≤ ω)ϕ(n) is Ω-invariant. Hence, there is an Ω-invariant function
providing a witness n0 for ϕ(n0) (Compare item (5) in Definition 10).
Secondly, we show that a ∆1-formula is Ω-invariant. To this end, assume ψ ∈ ∆1,
i.e. for some ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ ∆0, we have that
(3) ψ(m)↔ (∃n1 ∈ N)ϕ1(n1,m)↔ (∀n2 ∈ N)ϕ2(n2,m),
for all m ∈ N. Now fix some ω′ ∈ Ω. Let pψ(m) be the least n1 ≤ ω′ such that
ϕ1(n1,m), if such exists and ω′ otherwise. Let qψ(m) be the least n2 ≤ ω′ such
that ¬ϕ2(n2,m) if such exists and ω′ otherwise. For m ∈ N, if ψ(m) holds, then
pψ(m) is finite and qψ(m) is infinite. In particular, we have pψ(m) < qψ(m). Now
suppose there is some m0 ∈ N such that pψ(m0) < qψ(m0) and ¬ψ(m0). By (3), we
have (∀n1 ∈ N)¬ϕ1(n1,m0) and, by definition, the number pψ(m) must be infinite.
Similarly, the number qψ(m0) must be finite. However, this implies pψ(m0) ≥
qψ(m0), which yields a contradiction. Thus, we have ψ(m)↔ pψ(m) < qψ(m), for
all m ∈ N. It is clear that we obtain the same result for a different choice of ω′ ∈ Ω,
implying that ψ is Ω-invariant.
Care should be taken to choose the right axiom system to formalize the above
informal derivation. Indeed, in certain axiom systems, not all ∆1-formulas are
Ω-invariant.
Finally, we consider the following transfer principle from Nonstandard Analysis.
9. Principle. For all ϕ in ∆0, we have
(4) (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)→ (∀n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n).
The previous principle is called ‘Π1-TRANS’ or ‘Π1-transfer’. Note that Π1-
transfer expresses that N and ∗N have the same properties. In other words, the
properties of N are transferred to ∗N. In what follows, we do not assume that this
principle is given.
3.2. Constructive Analysis and Constructive Reverse Mathematics. In
this section, we sketch an overview of the discipline Constructive Reverse Mathe-
matics (CRM). In order to describe CRM, we first need to briefly consider Errett
Bishop’s Constructive Analysis.
Inspired by L.E.J. Brouwer’s famous foundational program of intuitionism25,
Bishop initiated the redevelopment of classical mathematics with an emphasis on
algorithmic and computational results. In his famous monograph25 Foundations
of Constructive Analysis, he lays the groundwork for this enterprise. In honour of
Bishop, the informal system of Constructive Analysis is now called ‘BISH’. In time,
it became clear to the practitioners of Constructive Analysis that intuitionistic logic
provides a suitable formalization26 for BISH.
10. Definition (Connectives in BISH).
(1) The disjunction P ∨Q: we have an algorithm that outputs either P or Q,
together with a proof of the chosen disjunct.
24The function (µk ≤ m)ψ(k) computes the least k ≤ m such that ψ(k), for ψ in ∆0. It is
available in most logical systems.
25See (van Heijenoort, 1967) and (Bishop, 1967).
26See (Bridges, 1999, p. 96) and (Richman, 1990).
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(2) The conjunction P ∧Q: we have a proof of P and of Q.
(3) The implication P → Q: by means of an algorithm we can convert any
proof of P into a proof of Q.
(4) The negation ¬P : assuming P , we can derive a contradiction (such as
0 = 1); equivalently, we can prove P → (0 = 1).
(5) The formula (∃x)P (x): we have (i) an algorithm that computes a certain
object x, and (ii) an algorithm that, using the information supplied by the
application of algorithm (i), demonstrates that P (x) holds.
(6) The formula (∀x ∈ A)P (x): we have an algorithm that, applied to an object
x and a proof that x ∈ A, demonstrates that P (x) holds.
Having sketched Bishop’s Constructive Analysis, we now introduce Construc-
tive Reverse Mathematics. In effect, Constructive Reverse Mathematics (CRM) is
a spin-off from the Reverse Mathematics program introduced in Section 2.2. In
CRM, the base theory is (inspired by) BISH and the aim is to find the minimal
axioms that prove a certain non-constructive theorem. As in Friedman-Simpson
style Reverse Mathematics, we also observe many equivalences between theorems
and the associated minimal axioms.
We now provide two important CRM results27. First of all, we consider the
limited principle of omniscience (LPO).
11. Theorem. In BISH, the following are equivalent.
(1) LPO: P ∨ ¬P (P ∈ Σ1).
(2) LPR: (∀x ∈ R)(x > 0 ∨ ¬(x > 0)).
(3) MCT: (The monotone convergence theorem) Every monotone bounded se-
quence of real numbers converges to a limit.
(4) CIT: (The Cantor intersection theorem).
For MCT (resp. CIT), an algorithm computes the limit (resp. real in the inter-
section). Next, we list some equivalences of LLPO, the lesser limited principle of
omniscience. Note that LLPO is an instance of De Morgan’s law.
12. Theorem. In BISH, the following are equivalent.
(1) LLPO: ¬(P ∧Q)→ ¬P ∨ ¬Q (P,Q ∈ Σ1).
(2) LLPR: (∀x ∈ R)[¬(x > 0) ∨ ¬(x < 0)].
(3) NIL: (∀x, y ∈ R)(xy = 0→ x = 0 ∨ y = 0).
(4) CLO: For all x, y ∈ R with ¬(x < y), {x, y} is a closed set.
(5) IVT: a version of the intermediate value theorem.
(6) WEI: a version of the Weierstraß extremum theorem.
For IVT (resp. WEI), an algorithm computes the interm. value (resp. maximum).
It should be noted that any result proved in BISH is compatible28 with classical,
intuitionistic and recursive mathematics.
3.3. Reverse-engineering Reverse Mathematics. In this section, we sketch
a translation29 of results from Constructive Reverse Mathematics to Nonstandard
27These results are taken from (Ishihara, 2006).
28See (Bishop, 1967) or (Ishihara, 2006).
29Note that we use the word ‘translation’ informally: The definition of V is inspired by the
intuitionistic disjunction, but that is the only connection.
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Analysis. We translate29 Bishop’s primitive notion of algorithm and finite procedure
as the notion of Ω-invariance in Nonstandard Analysis. Following Definition 10, the
intuitionistic disjunction translates29 to the following in Nonstandard Analysis.
13. Definition. [Hyperdisjunction] For formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2, the formula ϕ1(n)Vϕ2(n)
is the statement: There is an Ω-invariant formula ψ such that
(5) (∀n ∈ N)(ψ(n,ω)→ ϕ1(n) ∧ ¬ψ(n,ω)→ ϕ2(n).
Note that ϕ1(n)Vϕ2(n) indeed implies ϕ1(n) ∨ ϕ2(n). Furthermore, given the
formula ϕ1(n)Vϕ2(n), there is an Ω-invariant procedure (provided by ψ(n,ω)) to
determine which disjunct of ϕ1(n)∨ϕ2(n) makes it true. Thus, we observe that the
meaning of the hyperdisjunction ‘V’ is quite close to its intuitionistic counterpart
‘∨’ from Definition 10.
The other intuitionistic connectives may be translated analogously. The transla-
tion of → (resp. ¬) will be denoted ⇛ (resp. ∼). As for disjunction, the meaning of
the intuitionistic connectives is quite close to that of the hyperconnectives. Further-
more, as suggested by the following theorems, the equivalences from CRM remain
valid after the translation. In particular, we have the following theorems, to be
compared to Theorems 11 and 12.
14. Theorem. In Nonstandard Analysis, the following are equivalent.
(1) Π1-TRANS.
(2) LPO: P V∼P (P ∈ Σ1).
(3) LPR: (∀x ∈ R)(x > 0V∼(x > 0)).
(4) MCT: (The monotone convergence theorem) Every monotone bounded se-
quence of real numbers converges to a limit.
(5) CIT: (The Cantor intersection theorem).
Analogous to the context of CRM, in MCT (resp. CIT), the limit (resp. real in
the intersection) is computed by an Ω-invariant function.
15. Theorem. In NSA, the following are equivalent.
(1) LLPO: ∼(P ∧Q)⇛ ∼P V∼Q (P,Q ∈ Σ1).
(2) LLPR: (∀x ∈ R)[∼(x > 0)V∼(x < 0)].
(3) NIL: (∀x, y ∈ R)(xy = 0 ⇛ x = 0V y = 0).
(4) CLO: For all x, y ∈ R with ∼(x < y), {x, y} is a closed set.
(5) IVT: a version of the intermediate value theorem.
(6) WEI: a version of the Weierstraß extremum theorem.
Analogous to the context of CRM, in IVT (resp. WEI), the intermediate value
(resp. maximum) is computed by an Ω-invariant function.
The previous theorems only constitute an example of a general theme. In partic-
ular, it is possible to translate most30 theorems (and corresponding equivalences)
from CRM to Nonstandard Analysis in the same way as above. Comparing Theo-
rems 11 and 12 to Theorems 14 and 15, we conclude that the equivalences observed
in CRM remain intact after changing the underlying framework (based on algo-
rithm and intuitionistic logic, by Definition 10) to Nonstandard Analysis (based on
Ω-invariance and the hyperconnectives, by Definition 13). Hence, we observe the
robustness phenomenon described at the beginning of this section.
30See (Sanders, 2012) for a list of thirty translated theorems.
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In conclusion, we discuss just how far the analogy between Constructive Analysis
and Nonstandard Analysis takes us. For instance, on the level of intuition, the
formula ¬(x ≤ 0) does not imply x > 0, as the former expresses that it is impossible
that x ∈ R is below zero (but might still be very close to zero), while the latter
expresses that x is bounded away from zero by some rational q we may construct.
In Nonstandard Analysis, ∼(x ≤ 0) only states that for some (possible infinite)
k ∈ ∗N, we have 0 < 1
k
< x. Hence, ∼(x ≤ 0) is consistent with x ≈ 0, while x > 0 has
the same interpretation as in BISH. Thus, we observe a correspondence between
the latter and Nonstandard Analysis, even on the level of intuitions. A similar
conclusion follows from comparing the meaning of INT and INT, as is done after
Theorem 15.
Secondly, another interesting correspondence is provided by the equivalence be-
tween items (1) and (2) in Theorem 12. Indeed, to prove this equivalence, one
requires the axiom ¬(x > 0 ∧ x < 0) of the constructive continuum31. As it turns
out, to establish the equivalence between items (1) and (2) in Theorem 15, the for-
mula ∼(x > 0∧x < 0) is needed in Nonstandard Analysis. Hence, the correspondence
between BISH and the latter goes deeper than merely superficial resemblance.
Thirdly, we discuss the above result in the light of the so-called Brouwer-Heyting-
Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation, given by Definition 10. While the equivalences
in Theorems 14 and 15 are proved in classical logic, they carry a lot more informa-
tion. For instance, to show that LPR implies LPO, a formula ψ(x⃗, n, ω) is defined30
such that ψ(x⃗, ⌜ψ1⌝, ω) is an Ω-invariant formula which decides between P and ∼P
(P ∈ Σ1), for every Ω-invariant formula ψ1(x⃗, ω) which decides between x > 0 and∼(x > 0). Hence, we do not only have LPR → LPO, but also an implication akin to
the BHK interpretation, i.e. that an Ω-invariant decision procedure is converted,
by an Ω-invariant procedure, to another Ω-invariant decision procedure.
We finish this section with the following remark.
16. Remark (Reuniting the antipodes). The title of this section refers to a con-
ference with the same name held in 1999 in Venice. Following Bishop’s strong
criticism32 of Nonstandard Analysis, this conference was part of a reconciliatory at-
tempts between the communities of Nonstandard Analysis and Constructive Anal-
ysis. Little work33 has indeed taken place in the intersection of these disciplines,
but Theorems 14 and 15 can be interpreted as an attempt at reuniting the antipodes
that are Nonstandard and Constructive Analysis. Nonetheless, it has been noted
in the past34 that Nonstandard Analysis has a constructive dimension.
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